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A Response to Stephen Windmueller’s Essay  
By Robert Michael  
I would like to thank the editor of Menorah Review for the opportunity 
to reply to Stephen F. Windmueller’s review of my book, “A Concise 
History of American Anti-Semitism,” which appeared in Issue 67.  
Admittedly, if I were to write this book today, I would mention the 
amazing movement of conservative Protestantism toward Zionism. 
Even so, ask a convinced evangelical Protestant what will happen to a 
Jew, an authentic Jew, when he/she dies, and by virtue of their the-
ology they will say, “you must go to hell.” I once sat for jury duty and 
while awaiting the slow grind of the judicial system, I sat next to an 
interpreter for the deaf. She and I discussed many subjects with great 
joy until I mentioned I was a Jew. But then she recovered and showed 
me how to sign, “I am a Jew.” I then asked her where I would go when 
I died. She replied, “I’d defend you in this life against any injustice.” I 
persisted, and she told me, “Well, you will go to hell.”  
“How about my parents and grandparents, where are they now?”  
“Why in hell, of course.”  
Granted the importance of economic, secular, leftist, Islamist an-
ti-Semitism, Christianity nevertheless remains its fons et origo. Post-
war studies have confirmed that anti-Jewish ideology embodied within 
the Christian religious perspective provided the fundamental basis 
for American anti-Semitism, even apparent secular anti-Jewishness. 
[See, e.g., Egal Feldman, “Dual Destinies: The Jewish Encounter with 
Protestant America” (Chicago 1990).] After a careful study of American 
opinion in the 1960s, for example, Charles Glock and Rodney Stark 
were surprised to discover that, at a time of growing ecumenical 
harmony, almost all Americans who were anti-Semitic (about half the 
population) got their stereotypes of Jews from their Christian religions. 
They believed that Jews were responsible for crucifying Christ; that 
Jews could not be forgiven for this act until they converted; that God 
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punished Jews because they rejected Him; that the Jews were re-
sponsible for their own suffering; that religious anti-Semitism was not 
“demented” or “bizarre” but, on the contrary, eminently “respectable.” 
At least through the 1960s, “historically, it is clear that the heart and 
soul of anti-Semitism rested on Christianity.” [Charles Glock and Rod-
ney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York 1966), xvi, 
50-65, 73-4, 105, 185-7.]  
American deference to Christianity has gone hand in hand with nativist 
movements that claim to be based in great part on Christian values. 
[Nativism consists of majority opposition to an internal minority group 
perceived to be an alien threat to the majority’s values. B. H. Harto-
gensis, “Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-Believ-
ers in the United States,” The Yale Law Journal (March 1930),  660-1.] 
Xenophobic and isolationist Americans centered their ideology on the 
traditional beliefs that the Jews were the archetypal aliens and that 
their nativist economic and political problems were rooted in a conspir-
acy led by “usurious” and “world-dominating” Jews.  
Throughout the colonial period and after, despite many instances of 
good Jewish-Christian relations, most Americans seemed to hold the 
belief that Jews were cast out of the economy of salvation because 
Jews rejected and crucified Christ and continued to do so in every gen-
eration. This anti-Jewish ideology was carried to the New World from 
the Old. Just as each of the Emperor Napoleon I’s troops were believed 
to carry a Marshal’s baton in their knapsacks, so immigrants carried 
their anti-Semitism from Europe to America.  
Anti-Jewish prejudice spread to non-Christians like Blacks and Indians, 
who were indoctrinated into the Christian religion. Although the Amer-
ican brand of anti-Jewish bigotry was milder than its European pro-
genitor, nevertheless, in colonial times and later, Jews were commonly 
denigrated in the press, “Jew” being considered a dirty word. Although 
no pogroms against Jews occurred in the American colonies, Jewish 
cemeteries were desecrated and Jews were insulted because of their 
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Jewishness. Many of the teachings of the Sunday schools and other 
religious institutions were anti-Jewish. [Gordon Allport, The Nature of 
Prejudice, 446.]  
In the 1960s, even at a time of growing ecumenical harmony led by 
the Catholic Vatican II Council, about half of the Americans interviewed 
– both Catholic and Protestant, both lay and clergy – believed that:  
• All Jews were responsible for crucifying Christ, and they could not 
be forgiven for this act until they converted.  
• God punishes Jews because they reject Christ.  
• The Jews are responsible for their own suffering.   
Glock and Stark concluded that “the heart and soul of anti-Semitism 
rested on Christianity,” that 95 percent of Americans got their secular 
stereotypes of Jews from the Christian religion. [Charles Glock and 
Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York 1966), 
xvi, 185-7, 50-65, 73-4, 105. See also Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward 
Shepherds (New York 1971), 5, 9-10, 50; Alphons Silbermann , Sind 
Wir Anti-Semiten? (Cologne 1982), 51-2.]  
Gordon Allport concluded that religion stood as the focus of prejudice 
because “it is the pivot of the cultural tradition of a group.” [Gordon 
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 446.] Christianity, unlike any other 
group in Western history, has dominated the West for the last 1700 
years.  
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Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide: Similarities and Dif-
ferences  
“Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe 
by Benjamin Lieberman.” Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.  
A review essay by Paul R. Bartrop  
Like “genocide,” the term “ethnic cleansing” is new, but what it 
describes is centuries old. The phrase was originally introduced by 
reporters covering the Yugoslav wars of disintegration between 1991 
and 1995, but as a course of action it is much older than that. In its 
essence, ethnic cleansing means the forced and permanent removal 
of one group of people, by another, from a region or territory, and the 
subsequent occupation of that land by members of the perpetrator 
group as though the target group had never existed there.  
Generally speaking, any means can be (and have been) employed to 
effect such removal: legislation; forced expulsion; voluntary evacua-
tion; intimidation through threats; intimidation through violence; and 
genocide – the ultimate form of permanent removal.  
It is this final means that causes the greatest degree of confusion for 
observers of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing in the modern world. 
In the eyes of many, genocide and ethnic cleansing equate directly 
with each other, but a closer look at the two terms reveals that such 
is not the case. Genocide, a crime in international law defined by 
United Nations statute and incorporated precisely into the legal codes 
of a majority of the world’s nation states, is a very precise category 
of crime. Ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, is the name given to a 
form of behavior embracing a number of crimes that fall within other 
groupings: war crimes, crimes against humanity (both of which, it 
should be emphasized, are categories of crimes, rather than crimes 
per se), and, on occasion, the crime of genocide itself.  
Consequently, there is no universally-recognized definition of ethnic 
cleansing; nor is there a specific crime in international law that outlaws 
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it – even though elements of the practice are banned under other leg-
islation (for example, murder, deportation, torture, rape, persecution 
on political, racial and religious grounds and genocide). 
When Raphael Lemkin introduced the term genocide in 1944, in his 
book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” he wrote about the destruction 
of a nation or ethnic group. The means to achieve such destruction, as 
he saw it, did not include deportation or forced removal of populations 
from a territory; these acts are not necessarily aimed at destroying the 
group, just at moving it away from a designated piece of land. Then, 
when the United Nations enacted the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, on December 9, 1948, its 
key definitional term was “intent to destroy” – not “intent to remove.” 
All of the ways in which this could be achieved, as outlined in Article 
II of the Convention, are the means by which the United Nations, 
through to today, considers that group destruction can take place. 
Removal of a group in order to obtain coveted land, according to which 
the group may retain its existence in another place – that is, ethnic 
cleansing – is not group destruction occasioning genocide.  
That having been said, of course, genocide can be employed to clear 
territory of an unwanted population, but when this happens we find 
that we have to interrogate the perpetrators as to their preferred goal: 
acquisition of “cleansed” territory, or destruction of a targeted group? 
Which is the priority? Is one simply a means to an end? And, ultimate-
ly, why should the distinction matter?  
Untangling the knot is one of the tasks Benjamin Lieberman, of Fitch-
burg State College, Massachusetts, has set himself in “Terrible Fate: 
Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe.” As can be readily 
ascertained from the title, his primary concern is with the notion of 
ethnic cleansing: genocide plays a part, certainly, but Lieberman is 
most interested in the huge population movements that took place 
in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and what 
impact these movements had on forming the Europe we see before us 
today.  
8 | VCU Menorah Review
In considering his topic, Lieberman does not plead or moralize about 
the justice or injustice of this or that situation: there is more than 
enough of a damning or condemnatory nature, within the narrative 
itself, that anything more from Lieberman would seem superfluous. 
Commencing with an account of the fate of the Turks and Bulgarians of 
Salonica in the nineteenth century, Lieberman takes his readers on an 
engagingly-written tour of Eastern and Central Europe, the Near East 
and the Russian Empire, and shows how it came about that vast areas 
within these regions are no longer peopled in the same manner as 
they used to be. Along the way, we witness pogroms, mass murders, 
forced population movements, voluntary exile and genocide.  
We see the Holocaust, described in its ethnic cleansing dimension, as 
a phenomenon in which the Nazis and their collaborators sought the 
total elimination of the Jews from society in order to reinforce their 
own sense of ethnic “purity.” The territories then occupied would be – 
as the terms in the German language expressed it – “Judenfrei” (“Jew 
Free”), or “Judenrein” (“Cleansed of Jews); and this was well before 
the majority of Jews who died in the death camps were even sent 
there. Deprivation of liberty and incarceration in ghettos was a vital 
step on the road to the ethnic cleansing of Europe’s Jews, as it began 
the process of removal from the general (non-Jewish) population.  
Lieberman is adamant that the Holocaust is not to be separated out 
from the broader experience of European horror during the 20th cen-
tury, and is most skillful in pointing out how it was a culmination of all 
that had been developing beforehand. Yet perhaps the most appealing 
dimension of Lieberman’s work is in the form his analysis of ethnic 
cleansing takes. While his thematic division is largely chronological and 
geographic, his “big picture” perspective shows that ethnic cleansing 
over the past two centuries has in fact been a phenomenon that has 
transcended boundaries; that has operated from a variety of motives; 
that has caused a massive amount of damage in physical, economic 
and psychological terms; and that has had a lasting – and probably 
permanent – impact on the composition of modern European society 
and politics.  
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While this might seem so self-evident as to be a given, Lieberman’s 
extensive research brings to the fore – “rescued” might be a more use-
ful word – a history that needs to be re-examined for a new readership 
precisely because of its obviousness. It is not enough simply to pre-
sume that ethnic cleansing is a bad thing; scholars need to be aware 
of just how extensive that destruction was, of which people were tar-
geted, and of why they were. In short, a 21st century audience needs 
to become aware of the finer details of each and every case of the 
horrendous criminal acts to which various peoples in the 19th and 20th 
centuries were subjected. Benjamin Lieberman’s work will prove to be 
of exceptional assistance to a new generation of scholars tackling the 
important task of asking serious questions about what was perhaps the 
most defining characteristic of the last 150 years, and for his efforts he 
is to be commended, and his work disseminated widely. 
Paul R. Bartrop is head, Department of History, Bialik College, Mel-
bourne, Victoria, Australia, and a contributing editor.  
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On Biblical Personality 
By Matthew Schwartz  
“Biblical Stories for Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Sourcebook,” 
by Matthew Schwartz and Kalman Kaplan, Haworth Press. 
“The Fruit of Her Hands: Psychology of the Biblical Woman,” by Mat-
thew Schwartz and Kalman Kaplan, Eerdmans. 
Menorah Review provides a congenial and unique format for discus-
sion on new books in Judaica including, in this instance, some of my 
thoughts on two books of which I am co-author. 
An American college class that deals with the Hebrew Bible typically 
includes a heterogeny of Christians, Jews, Moslems and non-believers. 
A conscientious teacher will hope to avoid insulting students or forcing 
a narrow argumentative approach on them. In my classroom, I present 
to students the varying points of view from the most devout and tradi-
tional to the most radically untraditional and tell them to make up their 
own minds. In these two books, we two authors have not argued a 
doctrinal position as to the origins of the Hebrew Bible. We each have 
our own ideas as to the authoring of the Bible, and this issue is indeed 
very important not only to its readers but to world history.  However, 
this is not our interest here. We prefer to engage our readers as we do 
our students on the common ground of the Hebrew Bible as offering a 
unique and significant wisdom. 
Much of the direction of the study of Bible in universities today is in 
the scientific mode, seeking to define the Bible in terms of archaeology 
and higher criticism. This is true even in some religious seminaries. 
Popular books like “The Da Vinci Code” have helped to spur a certain 
cynicism toward traditional Christianity, and scholarly works like Pro-
fessor Bart Ehrman’s have hit the best seller list with their questioning 
of the accuracy of  New Testament texts and their accounts of alter-
nate gospels known to the ancients and rediscovered only recently. 
My colleague, Kalman Kaplan, a psychologist, and I, a historian, have 
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published two books (“Biblical Stories for Psychotherapy: A Source-
book,” 2004, and “The Fruit of Her Hands: The Psychology of Biblical 
Woman,” 2007), which follow a literary and psychological approach. 
The Hebrew Bible is a treasury of human portraits which offers import-
ant insights into human personality and history. Our first book argues 
that modern Freudian based psychology, while offering very significant 
ideas, is heavily dependent on a view of people that it derives from 
Greek mythology and theater. Study of characters like Oedipus, Electra 
and Narcissus draws one toward the tragedians’ view of people, in 
which one can seek some degree of self-understanding, but in doing 
so can destroy himself, as Oedipus and Narcissus actually do Devotion 
to a seemingly noble ideal will involve errors in both understanding 
and in human relationships that can lead inexorably to suicide as with 
Antigone, and heroic achievement too must lead surely to death, as 
with Achilles. The high incidence of suicide and child exposure in both 
Graeco-Roman literature and history expresses the tone of Greek 
thought and life. 
The Hebrew Bible offers a very different view of people. Life is not es-
sentially tragic or capricious, but instead has important meaning. One 
could sit down to a banquet with Abraham or Moses and feel secure 
that food as well as the conversation will be both tasty and kosher. 
If one sits to dine with the family of Agamemnon, or even with an 
Olympian god, one can never be sure that he will not be served poison 
or even the flesh of his own relatives. People can better themselves 
by learning and by experience. They should try to be virtuous and 
God-fearing, not heroic. They must choose life over death, and suicide 
is not an acceptable option, as it was for so many Greeks and Romans. 
We present 58 stories of Biblical characters, relying freely on the 
insights of both rabbinic commentators and modern Psychology. How 
did Biblical people deal with challenges like illness, disappointment, 
handicaps, freedom, self-esteem, child raising, marriage problems or 
ageing? We provide also a brief psychological commentary to each 
story, explaining how the story could be used in actual cases of coun-
seling. We propose that it is high time to develop a psychotherapy 
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which makes extensive use of Biblical personality models. 
The Hebrew Bible is a book of teaching which follows a path very dif-
ferent from the mythological. This is a point recognized by interpreters 
of the Bible as diverse as Professor Yehezkel Kaufmann and Rabbi 
Zalman Sorotskin. The Hebrew Bible is for us neither preachy nor 
rigidly didactic. Its strength for our purposes in this book rests in its 
psychological insight and its positive, life-oriented, non-mythological, 
monotheistic attitude. 
“The Fruit of Her Hands: A Psychology of Biblical Woman” centers on 
the theme that Biblical women can have a strong grasp of their place 
in God’s plan for the unfolding of history. These women feel that histo-
ry has a beginning and an ultimate goal and that their contribution to 
that process is essential. A woman can act with wisdom, strength and 
courage in pursuing those aims. Her relationships with other people 
and with the daily world are tempered by her own higher purpose. Part 
of the Biblical woman’s function is expressed in the Genesis II term 
“help meet opposite” which, translated from King James English into 
our own, has the connotation of a “suitable help in loyal opposition.” 
She must meld her independence of thought and act with her genuine 
support of others, all this set in the context of seeking to fulfill her 
historical God-given potential and the world’s. 
Certainly not every woman in the Hebrew Bible totally succeeds in 
these tasks. Some fail badly and some are thoroughly rotten char-
acters, e.g. Jezebel or Zeresh, but the best of them score very high 
and enjoy lives full of purpose. “The Fruit of Her Hands” follows the 
format of the earlier book, offering portraits of over 50 Biblical women, 
some good some evil but all memorable. Sarah, Rebecca and Ruth are 
obvious choices. Rahab, Achsa, Rizpah and Gomer are less obvious 
but hardly less interesting. The Biblical woman contrasts strongly with 
heroines of Greek myth and of later Western literature, who seem 
unable to define themselves other than in terms of  relationships 
with men be it fathers, husbands, lovers, brothers or sons,  and the 
relationships are typically unhealthy.  Flaubert’s Mme. Bovary destroys 
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herself and her family in meaningless affairs. Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina 
too abandons her family for an affair and ends by throwing herself 
under a moving train. In the Greek drama, Iphigenia is offered by her 
father as a sacrifice, Medea murders her sons, Jocasta, mother/wife 
of Oedipus, hangs herself, and Pandora is a pretty messenger sent by 
Zeus in a nasty trick to bring misery to the world.  These women are 
left frustrated, unfulfilled and often destructive. 
Menorah Review’s format perhaps will allow a personal note. My col-
league, Kaplan, is a professor of both clinical and social psychology 
with many years of experience. We have worked together for 25 years 
on a variety of scholarly projects. We are very different in our training, 
our skills, our lifestyles and our personalities, but I respect Kal’s intel-
lectual honesty and openness, and we share recognition of the beauty 
and depth of the Hebrew Bible as world class literature. We have found 
that two working together can accomplish more than the mere sum of 
two parts. 
Matthew Schwartz is a professor in the history department of Wayne 
State University and a contributing editor  
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Telling Tales 
“Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: Historys Double 
Helix, ” edited by Robert Rotberg. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press  
A review essay by Peter J. Haas 
The motivating thesis of the book is set forth in its very first sentenc-
es. “Every conflict is justified by a narrative of grievance, accusation 
and indignity. Conflicts depend on narratives, and in some senses 
cannot exist without a detailed explanation of how and why the battles 
began and why one side, and only one side, is in the right.” (Preface, 
pg vii.) The 11 essays that comprise this book are not, however, 
about narrative structure of meaning per se, although this is certainly 
discussed. Rather they all address one specific set of competing nar-
ratives, namely, those of the Palestinians and the Israelis. In fact, the 
narration of this conflict, in its various forms, serves as the paradig-
matic example of the thesis. The purpose of the book, then, is not to 
demonstrate the power of narratives, but rather to get at the structure 
of the genre “conflict narrative” by using the Palestinian narratives 
and the Israeli narratives as prime, even defining, examples. The end 
result of reading the 11 essays that make up this book, and which are 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly in conversation with each other, is 
to see that there are in fact different narratives in this conflict, that 
each is a construct that has its own internal consistency and that both 
are constructed with the other in mind (hence the double helix imag-
ery). That this assertion has to be argued at all is already an indication 
of how entrenched we all are in the narratives that construct the con-
flict and give it its various meanings. 
The stage for the dialogue (and sometimes monologue) which follows 
is set in the opening essay by Robert Rotberg, who also served as 
editor of the volume. “In Building Legitimacy through Narrative” he 
argues that both Israeli Jews and Palestinians are peoples who have 
been, and are still now, constructing their own identities through the 
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medium of grand narratives (my phrase, not his). The essays gathered 
here, Rotberg tells us, will take us through a series of propositions. 
The first is that conflict narratives not only define the conflict, but also 
function as a coping mechanism. The narratives articulate both the 
legitimacy of the cause and the justification, even glorification, of the 
sacrifice needed for the struggle to succeed. For the Palestine-Israeli 
conflict there are two narrative complexes which are both distinct and 
yet tightly intertwined and interdependent. Second, both sets of narra-
tives are built on the need to create a national identity, a need growing 
out of a shared experience under British domination and formed in 
more or less competition with each other. Third, for this conflict to 
move toward any form of reconciliation, some change in the grand 
narrative of each side will have to be made; if nothing more than the 
simple recognition that the other narrative exists, has some legitimacy 
and needs to be taken seriously. But, forth, any attempt to change the 
governing narrative will be resisted, even strenuously. Nonetheless, 
fifth, until such a mutual recognition is achieved no “legitimate” reduc-
tion of the conflict can even begin to occur. 
In this spirit, the contributors are focused not on delegitimizing one 
side or the other as much as they are focused on breaking down, or 
deconstructing, the narratives that each side is putting forward. There 
are no calls here for the destruction of the State of Israel, for example, 
or for the artificiality of the term “Palestinian”. The aim, rather, is to 
step outside the narrative structures which demand these outcomes 
and discuss the narratives as social constructs, not all-inclusive and 
true lists of facts. In other worlds, the aim of the book is not so much 
to get Jews to give up the Israeli narrative as it is to acknowledge 
the existence of a Palestinian narrative worthy of attention, and not 
to get Arab readers to give up the Palestinian narrative but rather to 
acknowledge that there is an Israeli narrative worthy of consideration. 
The next essay, “Israel-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict” by Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, spells out in greater 
detail the function of a “conflict narrative.” They note that among 
the chief functions of such a narrative is to offer a group a collective 
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memory which justifies its own struggle, stresses its own victimhood, 
delegitimizes the other side, and presents an argument for unity and 
steadfastness to carry on the battle. One aspect of such a narrative, 
the authors argue, is to portray one’s own side as truly interested in 
peace, while ones opponents are not; and in fact if the other side does 
make a gesture for peace, this is to be taken as insincere or duplici-
tous. 
This essay is followed by a lengthy analysis by Dina Porat on the devel-
opment of the standard Israeli Jewish narrative. Her most interesting 
point is that the Israeli (or, really, the Zionist) narrative was not origi-
nally constructed in opposition to the Arab narrative, which was, as far 
as it even existed, largely ignored. Rather the Zionist counter-narrative 
was aimed at European views of the Jews in general, and at the inter-
nal Diaspora politics of European Jewish communities more particu-
larly. As Porat points out, the internal struggles among various Zionist 
factions, and the struggles with anti-Zionist forces within especially 
East European Jewish society were much more pressing concerns. 
Even after the riots in the late 1930s, when the existence of an Arab 
nationalism thrust itself on the consciousness of the Yishuv, relations 
with the British occupation and concerns about the rise of Fascism in 
Europe were of much more concern than the local Arabs, who, as Porat 
pointedly notes, “were not perceived as carriers of consciousness and 
history (pg. 61).” In short, the construction of the pre-state Zionist 
narrative had much more to do with Europe than with the Orient. Ar-
abs were simply not relevant in shaping a Zionist narrative of identity. 
Porat’s analysis is followed Saleh Abdel Jawad’s discussion of the Arab/
Palestinian narratives of the 1948 war. His thesis is that the Arab 
narratives are much less well-formed than the Zionist/Israeli one for 
at least three reasons. One is the existence of several Arab narratives, 
coming out of different national and even class perspectives. Syrians 
tell a different story of what went wrong in 1948 than do Egyptians, for 
example; and the rich landowners have different stories than do the 
peasants. This diversity is compounded by the varying and changing 
ideologies of the diverse Arab states, whose changing fortunes work 
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against the creation of a single stable Arab counter-narrative. Second 
is the overarching power of the Israeli narrative. In essence, Abdel 
Jawad argues, the few Arab historians at work find themselves having 
to operate within the framework of the Israeli narrative and are having 
a hard time disentangling themselves from it. Finally, there is the issue 
of access to sources. Much of Palestinian history was destroyed by the 
Israelis, and what has survived is often sealed off by various govern-
ments (Israeli and Arab) for their own purposes. For example, many 
of the military-dominated Arab governments are pushing forward 
narratives that concentrate on the failure of civilian leadership while 
suppressing evidence pointing to military failures. Abdel Jawad ends 
by noting that the construction of a coherent history of the 1948 war is 
important not only in order to present a fuller picture of what “really” 
happened, but also as a vehicle for Arab healing and internal recon-
ciliation. Through such a history, maybe an acknowledgment of both 
people’s history can begin to take place, and thereby the first steps 
toward learning and mutual accommodation. 
The least helpful of the essays collected here is Nadim Rouhanas 
“Zionisms Encounter with the Palestinians.” The essay can roughly be 
summarized as follows: by determining that the Jewish homeland had 
to be in Palestine, the Zionist movement was obliged to use force and 
violence; this force and violence became the cultural basis for the Zi-
onist relationship to the Palestinians; such force and violence provoked 
the natural reaction among Palestinians of resistance; this has lead to 
a culture of fear among the Zionists which only leads them to more 
extreme acts of force and violence; if not stopped, they will eventually 
repeat the atrocities of 1948; the only hope is for outside international 
powers to force the Israelis to acknowledge the Palestinian story. 
Although the attention to Israeli fear is a useful insight into the conse-
quences of the “feedback loop” of the two conflict narrative traditions, 
the rest of the essay is little more than a retelling of a version of the 
Palestinian narrative. There is little scholarly distance here, an ob-
servation made explicitly made by Mordechai Bar-On in his essay. In 
contrast, the larger purpose of Bar-On’s contribution to the volume is 
18 | VCU Menorah Review
to give us a reflective history of Israeli historiography. Bar-Ons essay is 
helpful in bringing to the surface both the problems of writing a history 
of the 1948 period, and the changes that have occurred with the rise 
of the “new historians” in the 1990s. While he has his problems with 
some of the revisionist histories being produced by Israeli historians, 
Bar-On clearly thinks that such rethinking is useful overall. Post-Zion-
ism, he notes, has created deep rifts in Israeli society, but in so doing 
has opened new possibilities for understanding, if not necessarily ac-
cepting in its totality, the Palestinian narratives. His hope is that even-
tually Palestinians will be able to use the Israeli situation as a model 
for modifying their own historiography in a way that will be more open 
to what Israeli scholars have to say. 
Expressing some hope that this could indeed happen is the subject of 
Mark Tessler’s essay, “Narratives and Myths about Arab Intransigence 
toward Israel” and the following piece by Ilan Pappe on “bridging 
narratives.” A political scientist, Tessler asks us to reexamine some of 
the actual data, both in terms of overt policies of Arab states and in 
terms of public opinion polls. His basic questions are whether or not 
Arab attitudes toward Israel have shown themselves to be enduring 
and unchanging, and whether Arab critiques are about the existence 
of the State of Israel altogether or more about various policies of the 
government of Israel. His analysis leads to the conclusion that, first, 
Arab policies and attitudes seem to be malleable, changing according 
to context; and second, that over time critique has been aimed more 
at policies of the State rather than to its existence. It is of course 
important to put these findings into the social context of Palestinian 
and Arab society, which Tessler does. He notes at the very outset that 
narratives are based more on attitude and emotion than truth but 
nonetheless have to be regarded as real, even though they may not be 
accurate. People, after all, believe them sincerely. His point is not so 
much to debunk the Israeli narrative or idealize the Arab narrative as 
it is to note that such narratives are in the end mythic, and insofar as 
the facts upon which these myth are based are always more complex 
and nuanced than the narratives allow, these mythic narratives are 
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contingent. Pappe’s approach is to suggest that it is not enough simply 
to critique the Israeli grand narrative, but one must build a counter 
narrative, or what he terms a “bridge narrative,” that is, a story that 
both sides, in this case Palestinian and Israeli historians, would work 
on together. For this to be accomplished, both sides have to start from 
where they are and deconstruct their own sides narrative while work-
ing towards the other. His essay is thus a call for Israeli historians to 
begin the process of writing a new narrative, one that takes not only 
the Palestinian evidence (say, oral testimony) into account, but also 
looks at the normally forgotten groups, the disposed Arab farmers or 
the Sephardic Jews, for example. His assumption is that eventually 
Palestinian/Arab historians will take up the parallel work. 
The notion of a “bridging” narrative is taken further in the next essay 
in which Dan Bar-On and Sami Adwan discuss their attempt to forge 
just such an artifact in a joint project with Israeli and Palestinian 
teachers. As it turns out the project resulted not in a single joint or 
“bridge” narrative but in a series of booklets in which a version of the 
Israeli narrative, and a version of the Palestinian narrative were print-
ed side-by-side. The essay concludes with a sample that deals with 
the time of the Balfour Declaration. The project is impressive not only 
because it happened at all, but because it was conducted during the 
“Al-Aqsa” intifada with all the physical and psychological barriers for 
cooperative work that that implies. The end result was not agreement 
on a common narrative, but a kind of opening among pupils on each 
side to the narrative (and pain) of the other side. If nothing else, the 
exercise of producing the first few booklets of the projected series 
shows that dedicated teachers could, with some success, leave the 
confines of their own narratives and find some way to accommodate 
the other. The authors discuss how the project managed to unfold 
against the immense psychological counterforce of Israeli roadblocks 
and Palestinian suicide bombers. 
The last two essays, one by Nathan J. Brown on the debates surround-
ing the creation of Palestinian textbooks and the other by Eyal Naveh 
on debates in the Israeli education system, highlight remarkably 
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similar issues. In each case there is a foundational debate over what 
the students’ national identity should be, how that identity should 
be constructed in terms of the larger world, what kind of student the 
system should produce, and what values are to be taught. Given the 
competing agendas and needs of the two societies, it should come as 
no surprise that in both cases the actual textbooks reflect compromis-
es and so project mixed messages. On the Palestinian side, there is 
a strong attempt to create a Palestinian national identity in a society 
with deep traditions of other loyalties: family, tribe, religion, Arab and 
so forth. On the Israeli side, there are competing ethnic and religious 
identities: secular vs. religious, for example, or Ashkenazic vs. Sep-
hardic vs. Russian vs. indigenous Arab. In both societies, educators 
and textbook authors had to negotiate difficult and at times mutually 
exclusive political shoals to produce textbooks that convey something 
like a coherent message in both form and content. 
Maybe what is so useful in these final two contributions is that they 
illustrate how plastic the “narratives” are that are being conveyed in 
the classroom. The narrative structures so confidently asserted at the 
beginning of this volume dissolve in the end into a polyphony of voices 
views and visions. It may be precisely in this chaos of the middle that 
openness to something other than mutually exclusive narratives, if not 
some sort of “bridging” narrative, might one day find a place. In any 
case, it is refreshing to see at work a variety of scholars who are for 
the most part able to step out of their socially constructed and com-
fortable “realities” and reflect on how “conflict narratives” are created 
and deployed. It is also refreshing to see Israelis and Palestinians who 
have some hope that the current double helix of mutually-exclusive 
grand narratives can indeed be overcome. This book is a modest, but 
powerful, step in moving us in that direction. 
Peter J. Haas is the Abba Hillel Silver Professor of Jewish Studies, 
chairs the Department of Religion at Case Western Reserve University, 
and is a contributing editor.   
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Templ(Ar)Ing 
A poem by Richard Sherwin  
I have friends more full of faith than I 
waiting for the Temple from the sky 
Rabbi architects and artists crafting all 
the tools of priestly service lamps and altars 
Theyre raising herds and flocks for sacrifices 
Growing incense wine and herbs for spices 
The vestments and the men and choirs are ready 
The plans are finished, the will and hands are steady 
Talmudic arguments fly fast and thick 
Should we wait on Gd or build it quick 
Others meanwhile more or less like me 
look on enthralled amused or panicky 
Or worse indifferent or furious 
theyre still imposing Gd and stones on us 
Me I leave the Temple to my friends 
along with other mountain miracles 
I walk my daily prayers along the sea 
counting waves and omer, frothing free 
22 | VCU Menorah Review
And do the most I can of what's to do 
Invite a Kohen to a barbecue  
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The Ancient Grudge: The Merchant of Venice and Shy-
lock’s Christian Problem 
1. The Prologue  
Part 1 by Jack D. Spiro 
Look Again  
The Merchant of Venice is one of the most provocative and equivocal of 
Shakespeare’s plays. This is primarily true because of Shylock’s pivotal 
role and the multiple interpretations of his character through the cen-
turies. Is it possible to determine the identity of Shakespeare’s Shy-
lock? The following pages endeavor to answer this venerable question 
with all the historically and contextually relevant evidence available to 
us. 
William Levingston, a merchant in eighteenth century Willamsburg, 
Virginia planted the seed for the first legitimate theater in the colonies. 
In May 1752, the Hallams, a theatrical company from London, electri-
fied the theater-goers of Willamsburg by transforming their stage into 
the first truly legitimate theater of the New World. 
What an evening that must have been! Read all about it in the Virginia 
Gazette of August 21, 1752: 
“We are desired to inform the Publick, that as the Company…lately 
from London, have obtained His Honour the Governour’s Permission, 
and have with great Expense, entirely altered the Play-House of Wil-
liamsburg to a regular [i.e., legitimate] Theater, fit for the reception of 
Ladies and Gentlemen, and the Execution of their own Performances, 
they intend to open on the first Friday in September next, with a Play 
call’d ‘The Merchant of Venice,’ (written by Shakespeare)….The Ladies 
desired to give timely notice…for their places in the house, and on the 
Day of Performance to send their servants early to keep them in order 
to prevent Trouble and Disappointment.” 
The opening was dynamite. Not one empty seat, the house packed 
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with excited “first-nighters” including the Royal Governor and his offi-
cial family. Shakespeare came to a legitimate theater in the New World 
for the first time with the most controversial play he ever wrote. 
It is possible that John de Sequeyra, living in Williamsburg at the time, 
was also in attendance that night. He was a Sephardic Jew whose 
family came from Portugal during the Inquisition. He was born in Lon-
don in 1716, came to Williamsburg when he was 29 and died there at 
the age of 79. During 22 of those years he was visiting physician at 
the “Lunatic Asylum,” which now called Eastern State Hospital. He was 
also one of the most respected physicians in early Williamsburg. And 
something as glittering as opening night of the first legitimate theater 
may have enticed him to occupy one of its seats. 
De Sequeyra could have been motivated also by the major lead in the 
play – a Jew named Shylock who may have been of Sephardic descent 
since he lived in Venice. Did the play make him uneasy and uncomfort-
able? Did the play agitate the non-Jewish audience? Of course we don’t 
know, but chances are it did in some way because it has been agitating 
audiences since its initial performance at the end of the 17th century 
at the Globe Theater in London. 
But in May 1943, we know it delighted its audience at the Burgtheater 
in Vienna. The Holocaust has been raging for 17 months. Viennese 
Jews have already been transported in cattle cars to the eastern death 
camps. The city on the Danube is Judenrein. Members of the Nazi 
party in Vienna think it’s an opportune time to celebrate their achieve-
ment with a production of The Merchant of Venice. The part of Shylock 
is played by Werner Krauss. One critic comments that when Krauss 
appeared “something revoltingly alien and startlingly repulsive crawled 
across the stage.” And another critic describes Krauss’ Shylock with 
his “unsteady, cunning little eyes; the greasy caftan with the yellow 
prayer-shawl slung round; the splay-footed, shuffling walk; the foot 
stamping with rage; the claw-like gestures with the hands; the voice, 
now bawling, now muttering – all add up to a pathological image of the 
East European Jewish type, expressing all its inner and outer uncleanli-
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ness, emphasizing danger through humor.”  Krauss was a zealous Nazi. 
 Fifty-six years later, The Merchant of Venice is playing at the Shake-
speare Theater in Washington, D.C.  Hal Holbrook’s Shylock walks on 
stage thinking about the loan that Bassanio requested he extend to the 
merchant Antonio. He is tall, straight-backed, imposing in appearance, 
unmistakably Jewish with his head-covering and distinctive apparel. He 
speaks with authority and dignity. We know that this man cannot be 
easily intimidated. He takes pride in the legacy of his people, and he is 
aware of what they have endured through the centuries. His livelihood 
is not one that he considers dishonorable because he employs it with 
unreserved honesty. But he is subjected to relentless abuse and phys-
ical humiliation from the non-Jews in Venice where he works and lives 
with his daughter Jessica. 
I first saw the play in 1960 at Stratford-upon-Avon, with Peter O’Toole 
in the role of Shylock. His Shylock was a man of dignified bearing and 
diction intensely contrasted to a community of restive, temperamental 
Christians. Then I saw the video of Sir Lawrence Olivier’s Shylock – a 
sedate, top-hatted, aristocratic 19th century banker. At the Folger in 
Washington, D.C., I saw another Shylock pitted against a black Antonio 
reading the Wall Street Journal and discussing deals on his cellular 
phone. 
With only 400 lines, on stage in only five of 20 scenes – with the 
richly varied interpretations of Charles Macklin, Henry Irving, Edmund 
Kean, Werner Kraus, Lawrence Olivier, Orson Welles, Frederick Valk, 
Peter O’Toole, Warren Mitchell, Patrick Stewart, Dustin Hoffman, Hal 
Holbrook, Al Pacino, and many others – is there any character in 
the Shakespearean repertory who can summon forth the sweeping 
range of diverse and contradictory portrayals more exhaustively than 
Shylock? Ay, there’s the rub! A revolting Shylock in Vienna, a noble 
Shylock in Washington. Is there any way that we can possibly know 
Shakespeare’s Shylock – the Shylock that his peerlessly gifted creator 
intended to convey? Has any other play written by him provoked as 
much passionate contention, elicited as much discord as The Merchant 
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of Venice?  Through the decades, critics have been so variably at odds 
with each other in their readings that you might think we were refer-
ring to a vast assortment of different plays altogether. Shylock, to use 
Karl Jaspers’s expression, belongs to the “infinitely interpretable.”  
One of the reasons for the multiplicity of perceptions is the fact that 
the play is clearly characterized. Norman Rabkin wrote that by an 
“inexhaustible complexity [which] refuses to permit an unequivocal 
resolution [based largely on] an unresolvably problematic sense of 
human experience....At every point at which we want simplicity we get 
complexity.” (1981, pp. 28-29)  In presenting us with a profusion of 
equivocal signals and unresolved problems, the play always urges us, 
as Hazard Adams put it, to “look again.”  (1969, p. 141)  No matter 
how many times we see the play or read it, we seem to be always 
looking again. Every time I see it or read it, that is precisely what I 
find myself doing, which is the impetus for this book: to look yet again. 
The Dyer’s Hand  
One reason we feel impelled to do so relates to our playwright’s life 
and what he personally believed, about which there is much ado about 
virtually nothing. We know so little about the man, which in itself prob-
ably makes the concept that John Keats called “negative capability” all 
the more appropriate in the endeavor to understand The Merchant of 
Venice or any other play by Shakespeare. (Finney, 1963, pp. 238-244, 
326-333, 384-385, 472-481, 504-505, 532-537, 578-667, 712-742)   
Negative capability is the creative, unparalleled genius of giving mu-
tually conflicting notions full imaginative development....opening the 
mind to all kinds of possibilities, keeping it free of absolute certainty. 
This concept was first discussed by Keats in a letter he wrote to his 
brothers in December 1817:  "...it struck me what quality went to form 
a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which Shakespeare 
possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability, that is, when 
a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without 
any irritable reaching after fact and reason." Two years later Keats 
wrote to his brother George:  "The only means of strengthening one's 
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intellect is to make up one's mind about nothing -- to let the mind be 
a thoroughfare for all thoughts."  Keats made a distinction between 
reason and imagination in literature.  Reason, by nature, seeks to con-
struct an absolute and comprehensive system of philosophy into which 
it can fit and by which it can explain all of the facts of experience. 
Imagination apprehends truth in individual, isolated intuitions.  The 
imaginative mind is content with these isolated particles of truth, but 
the rational mind tries to fit imaginative intuitions into a rational sys-
tem. The negatively capable person of imagination can get out of him-
self and his environment and into the poetic persons and environments 
which his imagination creates.  He lives not only in this world but also 
in a thousand worlds.  To enter the minds of others completely is to 
understand them and, by understanding them, to pardon their faults, 
to love them for their virtues. The negatively capable character "is not 
itself – it has no self – it is every thing and nothing – It has no charac-
ter…it has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen....” 
The literary critic, William Hazlitt, preceded John Keats in identifying 
this concept when he said that Shakespeare had  "no personal char-
acter"– by means of observation and imagination, he could see life 
through the minds of others...he represented, with understanding and 
with justice, both the good and the evil, the noble and the base. Here 
are some excerpts from an essay Hazlitt wrote in 1815: 
1) “[Shakespeare] was the least of an egotist that it was possible to 
be. He was nothing in himself, but he was all that others were, or that 
they could become. He not only had in himself the germs of every fac-
ulty and feeling, but he could follow them by anticipation, intuitively, 
into all their conceivable ramifications, through every change of for-
tune or conflict of passion, or turn of thought....There was no respect 
of persons with him....He was like the genius of humanity, changing 
places with all of us at pleasure, and playing with our purposes as with 
his own.” 
2)  “[Shakespeare] took no part in the scene he describes, but gave 
fair play to all his characters, and left virtue and vice, folly and wis-
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dom, right and wrong, to fight it out between themselves, just as they 
do on their'old fighting stage'--the world.” 
3)  "His characters are real beings of flesh and blood; they speak like 
men, not like authors. One might suppose that he had stood by at the 
time and overheard all that passed." (Finney 1951, 1965 passim). 
Negative capability is the power of one mind imagining itself into 
another mind, which Shakespeare may have contemplated in Sonnet 
111:  “...my nature is subdued to what it works in, like the dyer’s 
hand.” 
Northrop Frye recognizes the same characteristic in the following 
excerpts: “Shakespeare seems to have had less of an ego center than 
any major poet of our culture....[Shakespeare] refrains from trying 
to impose any sort of personal attitude on us, and shows no  interest 
in anything except his play....there is no passage in Shakespeare’s 
plays...which cannot be explained entirely in terms of its dramatic 
function and context....there is nothing which owes its existence 
to Shakespeare’s desire to ‘say’ something....Shakespeare had no 
opinions, no values, no philosophy, no principles of anything except 
dramatic structure.” (1965, passim) 
These passages – Frye's way of saying that Shakespeare was "nega-
tively capable” -- certainly help to explain why we know almost noth-
ing  about the playwright.  His ego was so subdued that he left little 
trace of his own identity.  As W. H. Auden observed, he was, “to all 
intents and purposes, anonymous.” 
The conundrums of interpretation bring us to one of the most prom-
inent dichotomies of interpretation in all of Shakespeare’s plays and 
the one that primarily concerns us:  Do the contents of The Merchant 
of Venice tell us that the  play is anti-Jewish or do they indicate some-
thing else altogether?  Some say that Shakespeare was trying to tone 
down the discordant anti-Semitism of Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew 
of Malta with a more sympathetic portrait of the Jew while others see 
Shakespeare as trying to surpass the unabashed anti-Semitism of 
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Marlowe. (Ribner, 1964, p. 45) There will be more about this later. 
H. B. Charlton is one of the most unequivocal proponents of the an-
ti-Semitism theory. He writes that Shakespeare “planned a Merchant 
of Venice to let the Jew dog have it....The text itself preserves enough 
evidence of the author’s fixed intent to exhibit his Shylock as an 
inhuman scoundrel whose diabolical cunning is bent on gratifying a 
satanic lust for Christian flesh, the Jew, in fact, who was the ogre of 
the Medieval story and the cur to be exacerbated by all honest men.” 
(1973, p. 7)  Harold Bloom states:  “One would have to be blind, deaf, 
and dumb not to recognize that [this play] is a profoundly anti-Semitic 
work.”  (1998, p. 171)   Bloom would have to consider me blind, deaf 
and dumb since I advocate the contrary position. When we examine 
the play thoroughly, historically, comparatively, contextually, and em-
pathically,  Bloom’s position, I believe, becomes untenable. 
The antithetical interpretation was stated, among many others, by 
John Cooper who wrote that “we are not obliged by any historical 
evidence to think that Shakespeare intended to depict a Jew as a 
grotesque character or that such a stupid caricature was presented to 
the play’s Elizabethan audience.”  It is certainly verifiable from the text 
itself that Shakespeare took great pains to humanize Shylock into a 
portrait radically different from the usual portrait of the medieval mo-
rality and mystery plays, which reached their culmination in Marlowe’s 
Barabas. Which is the Christian, which the Jew?  We will see that every 
character in the play, without exception, is all too human with foibles 
and flaws that match or exceed Shylock’s.  Bernard Grebanier goes 
so far as to say that Shakespeare was incapable of bigotry and above 
prejudice. (in Cooper 1970, p. 118) 
One of the major problems we face is that the text is not only ambig-
uous but paradoxical in the sense that there are passages which could 
underscore and other passages which could undermine the anti-Jew-
ish, stereotypical image. I am also aware, of course, of the danger of 
equating one’s own presuppositions with the author’s actual intentions. 
The truth, therefore, has to come directly from the internal evidence 
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which, I believe, reinforces not a “pro-Jewish” or “anti-Jewish” play-
wright, but the playwright’s unparalleled gift of “negative capability;”  
namely, the natural faculty of  imagining  himself into the minds of 
others – all others – as well as into other times,  places, and cultures, 
into  a world where anti-Semitism was pervasive and endemic.  By ne-
gating his own ego, thereby suspending all judgment and subduing the 
temptation to be didactic, Shakespeare reflects the mirror of nature as 
it truly was in reality; that is, the nature of the negative, pernicious, 
and ultimately perilous interconnections between Jew and Christian – 
the centuries of animosity  beyond understanding; the persistence of 
substituting the label “Jew” or “Christian” for human being;  the unwill-
ingness to engage in genuine dialogues of mutual trust and friendship;  
the literal, unquestioning acceptance of scripture as absolute truth;  
the imposition by a Christian world of virtually unmitigated torment on 
the negligible minority of Jews wherever they lived; the un-Christian 
posture of Christendom; and the abysmal failure to communicate with 
the other because the other is either “insider” or “outsider.” 
How, then, do we determine if The Merchant of Venice is a play that 
flawlessly exemplifies and, at the same time, peerlessly accentuates 
the playwright’s power of negative capability, convincing us that the 
anti-Jewish world that Shakespeare created is independent of its cre-
ator?  We first examine his sources to determine what is original and 
inventive in Shakespeare’s adaptation of two, perhaps three, old tales. 
Probable Sources  
One of the most fruitful questions we can ask is this: When we exam-
ine all the sources that Shakespeare used for his plays, what is there 
in his drama – his plots and personalities – that is categorically differ-
ent from anything that appears in the various sources he used? 
An invaluable work for students of Shakespeare is the multi-volume 
collection of Shakespeare’s sources edited by Geoffrey Bullough. There 
are others, but his is the most nearly complete. When we study one 
play, The Merchant of Venice for example, it is helpful to go back to 
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the sources that Shakespeare used to see how he transformed them 
– what he eliminated and what he added – as he wove them into the 
texture of his own creative work. How he refashioned stories and char-
acters tells us a great deal about what he was trying to do because, by 
comparison, we can see what he decided to emphasize and highlight 
and what he decided to ignore.  We can also see what parts and per-
sonalities of a play are altogether new – what Shakespeare himself 
created.  By inference, then, we may have a good idea of what he was 
striving to communicate.  And so it is a worthwhile exercise to start 
with the sources of The Merchant of Venice. 
The most direct source, albeit in a more generalized way than earlier 
sources, for some plot ideas, character portrayals, and situations is 
Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta, which was produced just a 
few years prior to the production of Shakespeare’s play. It would seem 
that Shakespeare actually saw the play; certainly he read it and was 
influenced by it, as we will examine later.  But other indispensable 
influences on the development of The Merchant of Venice seem to be 
Ser Giovanni’s Il Pecorone, Gesta Romanorum, the 14th Novellino by 
Massuccio, and The Jew of Malta by Marlowe.  There are other possible 
sources worth examining. 
Il Pecorone (The Simpleton). Written in the fourteenth century by Ser 
Giovanni Fiorentino and published in 1558 in Milan. 
Although the flesh-bond story has been traced to the Indian Ma-
habarata(ca. 300 B.C.), similarities of incident and even identical 
language indicate that Shakespeare was thoroughly familiar with 
Fiorentino’s version of the story; for example: 
The Merchant of Venice (MV) and Il Pecerone (IP) -- Comparisons and 
Contrasts 
MV: When Portia enters the courtroom scene, the Duke commands 
Antonio and Shylock to “stand forth.” 
IP: The lawyer desires the Jew to “stand forth” before allowing the 
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forfeiture. 
** 
MV: In the same scene, Portia urges Shylock to take the money and 
“bid me tear the bond.” 
IP: After being judged, the Jew “tore in pieces the bond.” 
** 
MV: Antonio says, “Pray God Bassanio come to see me pay his debt, 
and then I care not.” 
IP: Ansaldo says to Gianneto, “I may see you before I die—then I will 
depart content. 
** 
MV: Portia: “If you cut’st more or less than a just pound…thou diest.” 
IP: The Lady of Belmonte: “Your paper makes no mention of the shed-
ding of blood, but says expressly that you may take a pound of flesh. 
Neither more nor less, and if I see one drop of blood more, off goes 
your head.” 
** 
MV: Shylock says, “I am content” in his utter defeat as he leaves the 
stage, never tobe seen again. 
IP: The Jew says, “I am content,” anticipating that the court will award 
him his ducats.                                                                              
** 
In this story, which contains over 30 resemblances to Shakespeare’s 
play, an unnamed Jew lends money to a Christian and demands a 
pound of flesh as repayment.  Bindo is a Florentine merchant whose 
youngest son is Giannetto. On his deathbed, Bindo tells Giannetto to 
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join his wealthy Christian godfather Ansaldo (who corresponds to An-
tonio)  in Venice to seek his fortune. In Venice, he decides to take one 
of Ansaldo’s ships to woo the coveted lady of Belmonte.  An incautious 
and prodigal young man, Giannetto demolishes a couple of ships, but 
still asks Ansaldo for another one.  Now Ansaldo must borrow money 
to provide Giannetto with a ship. He “went to a Jew of Mestri and 
borrowed [10,000 ducats] on condition that if they were not repaid the 
next June on St. John’s day, the [nameless] Jew might take a pound of 
flesh from whatever part of his body he pleased. Ansaldo agreed, and 
the Jew had a bond drawn up and witnessed with all necessary form 
and ceremony.”  After providing Giannetto with another ship, Ansaldo 
said to him: “My son, you are going and know the bond to which I 
agreed, I beseech you if misfortune comes to you that you will be 
pleased to return so that I may see you before I die–then I will de-
part content.”   Although Giannetto won the beautiful and rich lady of 
Belmonte, Ansaldo’s debt was not repaid on the day it was due. When 
he could repay the Jew, the latter refused anything but the pound of 
flesh.  The Jew’s motive was solely his craving for a pound of Christian 
flesh. The nameless lady of Belmonte, disguised as a lawyer, went to 
court to defend Giannetto and tricked the Jew by saying: “If you take 
more or less than a pound [of flesh], I shall have your head struck off. 
Moreover, I tell you that if one drop of blood is spilled, I shall have you 
put to death, for your bond does not mention the shedding of blood.”   
The Jew unavailingly demanded his money and, “seeing he could not 
do what he had wished, [he] took the bond and tore it in pieces in a 
fury. “ This part of the story is followed by the sub-plot of the “lawyer” 
asking Giannetto for the ring that his fair lady gave him. The most ob-
vious difference between Giovanni’s story and Shakespeare’s rendition 
is motive – a critical distinction. 
In the original, the motive is the desire to kill a Christian simply be-
cause he is a Christian.   But Shylock has no such motive. When he 
refers to the pound of flesh as a “merry sport” for guaranteeing the 
loan, there is no possibility that this practical man thought that Anto-
nio could possibly be ruined and incapable of repaying the loan.  For 
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there to be storms on seven seas and for these storms to occur exactly 
at the spot where Antonio’s ships were located are as conceivable as 
winning the lottery.  For Shylock, the forfeit of flesh was a sport, noth-
ing more.  In addition, Shylock’s disagreeable and painful dealings with 
Antonio are entirely missing in the original. Harry Golden remarked 
that “Shakespeare was the first writer in 700 years who gave the Jew 
a motive.”  (Gross 1992, p. 27) 
Gesta Romanorum (1577, revised in 1595): A collection of stories 
including that of “The Three Caskets” (called “Vessels” in this version). 
It is here that Shakespeare finds the segment of his play about the 
three caskets.   The Emperor of Rome showed the three vessels, as 
they are called, to the daughter of the King of Ampluy who wanted 
her to marry the Emperor’s son.  Within the first vessel, made of gold, 
were dead men’s bones with this inscription engraved on the front: 
“Whoso chooseth me shall find what he deserveth.”  The second ves-
sel, made of silver, filled with earth and worms, bore the inscription: 
“Whoso chooseth me shall find what his nature desireth.”  The third 
vessel was made of lead, filled with precious stones, and the inscrip-
tion read: “Whoso chooseth me shall find what God hath disposed for 
him.”  Since God never disposed of harm, the princess chose the lead 
vessel. The Emperor said: “Dear daughter, because you have wisely 
chosen you shall wed my son.” 
Il Novellino : An Italian novel by Masuccio of Salerno, writing around 
1470.  This may be the source of the critically important Jessica-Loren-
zo elopement story although no Elizabethan translation is known.  
A Neapolitan cavalier named Giuffredi Saccano was riding on horse-
back when he saw a young woman named Carmosina. When they 
looked at each other, a sudden passion inflamed both of them for one 
another.  Inquiring about her and her parentage, Giuffredi learned that 
she was the daughter of an “old man inordinately jealous and avari-
cious.”  He also learned that this miser kept his daughter locked up 
to keep suitors away. Contriving to get near to Carmosina,  Giuffredi 
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would buy different merchandise from the merchant and bring some of 
his friends to be customers as well. As a result, the merchant allowed 
a friendship to develop.  Then, continuing with his plan, Guifreddi 
asked the miser two things: if he would keep his slave girl Anna for a 
while so that he could take a trip home and for a loan of 30 ducats. 
The miser was happy to oblige and Anna entered the miser’s home. 
She befriended Carmosina and told her of Guiffredi’s plan to hide in 
a house next door and Anna would sneak her out of her own house 
to rendevous with Giuffredi.  Carmosina was thrilled and also “made 
up her mind to abstract from the store of her avaricious old father a 
much greater sum of money, about 1500 ducats,  than anyone could 
have reckoned sufficient for her dowry.” They slipped quietly out of 
the house and met the cavalier who took her to a nearby island where 
they were profoundly happy. They married and she had a child.  Even-
tually they returned to Naples and the “foolish old man atoned for the 
deed after all the damage had been done.” 
It may be that Shakespeare also got the idea of the Jessica segment 
from Marlowe’s depiction of Barabas and his daughter Abigail’s attitude 
toward him in The Jew of Malta.  In addition to the relational conflicts, 
Abigail also throws a bag of jewels from a window.  Barabas and Shy-
lock have only one child each, and their children are both in love with 
Christians.  Other than these rather nebulous similarities, the use of 
the daughter segment is radically different in Shakespeare’s rendition.  
Jessica’s character and deeds – her devious departure and betrayal 
of her father, the reckless spending, her greed and irresponsibility, 
her motives  for deserting Judaism and converting to Christianity, her 
prevarications and insecurities in a Christian environment--are entirely 
Shakespeare’s creation. 
The following sources may have been familiar to Shakespeare, but 
there is no clear documentation. 
Speculative Sources  
The Ballad of Gernutus: (Undated but written during the Renais-
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sance) 
This is the introductory quote: “Showing the cruelty of Gernutus, a Jew 
who, lending to a merchant 100 crowns, would have a pound of flesh, 
because the merchant couldn’t pay him at the day appointed.”  
The story then continues: “In Venice a cruel Jew dwelt who lived on 
usury,” thinking of how to deceive the poor. A merchant of great fame 
who lived in the city wanted to help his friend. Gernutus said if he 
couldn’t pay it back, he would have a pound of his flesh as the bond. 
When the merchant’s ships did not return on the day the loan was 
due; Gernutus had him incarcerated and demanded his bond. Weep-
ing friends came to plead with Gernutus and offered him money, but 
Gernutus said, “I will no gold, my forfeit I will have.” The judge tried to 
persuade him, but he insisted on the pound of flesh. “The bloody Jew” 
took “whetted blade in hand.” As he was about to cut, the judge said: 
“You must not shed a drop of blood.”  Gernutus then said he would 
take the money instead, but now the judge refused.  The Jew then 
departed. In closing the author says: “Many a wretch as ill as he still 
lives among us presently. May God deliver every Christian from such a 
wretch.” 
The Orator by Alexander Silvayn (1596) 
Silvayn sets up his story as a debate between a nameless Jew and a 
Christian merchant who borrowed 900 crowns. The contract stated 
that if he didn’t pay by a certain date, he would have to give the Jew 
a pound of his own flesh. The Jew refused to take money, demanding 
the flesh instead.  Then the judge ordered that only a pound could be 
cut, and if he cut any more or any less, he would be executed himself. 
The Jew speaks first in court and argues that contracts are broken to 
the detriment of the Commonwealth. Actually, other penalties are cru-
eler such as incarceration and slavery, which is practiced even among 
Christians. Perhaps having a pound of flesh cut is preferable to being 
imprisoned or enslaved. The breach of his promise also cost the Jew 
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a great deal in terms of the integrity of his credit. The pound of flesh 
may also be necessary as a deterrent to terrify Christians for abusing 
Jews. But the most important reason is that he owes it to the Jew – 
the reason actually needed.  In addition, the Jew can cut the pound 
from whichever part of his body will cause the least pain and sacrifice. 
The Christian replies:  What possible reason could the Jew have for 
demanding flesh other than the “ancient and cruel hate” that he bears 
to Christians and all other non-Jews?  The Christian believes that the 
Jew has caused the delay in the Christian’s receiving his money so that 
he could have the pound of flesh. He also asserts that Jews do this sort 
of thing to “offend our God whom they have crucified. Why? Because 
he was holy.”  Even the Bible says they are a rebellious people, and 
God dispersed them because of their sins.  Therefore, states the Chris-
tian, what can we possibly expect of them now since they neither have 
their faith nor their law – only their “rapines and usuries.”  Finally, the 
Christian hopes the judge will deliver him “from this monster’s cruelty.” 
Zelauto  by Anthony Munday (1580), subtitled: “The amorous life of 
Strabino a scholar, the brave behavior of Rodolfo a martial gentleman, 
and the right reward of Signor Truculento, a usurer.” 
Truculento wants to marry Cornelia, but Strabino and she are in love 
with each other.  Cornelia’s father promised her to Truculento. Cornelia 
devises a plan to deceive her father so she can marry Strabino. 
The story also contains the bond of flesh plot because Truculento, who 
is never identified as Jewish, lent money to Strabino and his friend 
Rodolfo who also is in love with Brisana. 
Sir Vincentio of Pescara sent his son Strabino to an academy in Ve-
rona for his education. Soon he developed a friendship with Rodolfo 
who was primarily interested in “martial exercises” rather than in his 
studies. Rodolfo had a sister, Cornelia, who was very attractive. Cor-
nelia did not encourage his love for her and he was melancholy with 
love-sickness. He and Rodolfo soon set out for Rodolfo’s father’s house. 
His name was Signor Cioralamo Ruscelli. But Cornelia had another 
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suitor, Signor Truculento, “an extorting usurer.” Truculento came to the 
house and offered Ruscelli a costly cup containing 500 crowns. Ruscelli 
responded favorably and called for his daughter. When learning the 
reason, she responded: “Will you for money marry me to a miser? 
Will you for riches have so little regard for me?”  Feeling spurned, 
Truculento departed just as Strabino and Rodolfo were approaching the 
house. 
When Strabino and Cornelia were together, she pledged herself to 
him and they sealed their love with a kiss. Then Cornelia conceived 
of a plan to deceive her father so she could marry Strabino instead of 
Truculento. She told them both to go to Truculento’s house and borrow 
enough money to purchase a certain jewel that Ruscelli had wanted. 
They went to Truculento’s house flattering him enough to gain the 
loan. But Truculento said that if they didn’t pay it back by a certain 
day both of them would lose their right eyes. They agreed and receive 
4000 ducats. 
As they were going to purchase the jewel, Rodolfo confided in his 
friend that he was in love with Brisana, Truculento’s daughter. They 
brought the jewel to Ruscelli and Strabino became engaged to Corne-
lia. 
Then the friends went to Truculento’s house, and Brisana opened 
the door. They expressed their love for each other and, unknown to 
Truculento, Ruscelli married the couples.  When Truculento found out 
about this, he was “bereft of his wits” and swore revenge. The next 
day, he forced Strabino and Rodolfo to appear before a judge. When 
they found out about it, Cornelia and Brisana disguised themselves as 
scholars of the law and appeared before the court. 
Truculento told the judge that they had missed the deadline for paying 
the debt and now he didn’t want the money anyway. Instead they 
must lose their right eyes “for falsifying their faith.” The judge then 
advised them to be as impartial as possible and called on Strabino to 
present his case. 
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Strabino then spoke, referring to Truculento as a “caterpillar” and 
“worm of the world.” He said they were only two days late and were 
willing to compensate Truculento accordingly. 
The judge then said that Strabino’s offer of paying more than he owes 
because of his delay was reasonable and asked Truculento to accept 
this. 
Truculento then replied that he only wanted his bond and asked for no 
more than the friends deserve. He said: “I crave justice to be uprightly 
used and I crave no more; therefore I will have it.” 
The judge responded that they had to honor Truculento’s demand.  Ro-
dolfo then spoke, saying that they were foolish to expect anything else 
from such a cut-throat and wretch. The judge called on their attorneys 
to speak in their behalf. 
Brisana was first, arguing that if she went to pay back the loan and 
the creditor was nowhere to be found, she could not be faulted if she 
didn’t pay it back on the date it was due. She further argued that 
Truculento made himself absent maliciously on purpose.  
 Truculento defended himself by saying that even though he was away, 
his house was not empty. His receiver, in his absence, represents him. 
Cornelia, disguised, argued that Truculento could have the eyes, but 
spilling one drop of blood from their eyes was not part of the bond, 
and if he should spill any blood then both his eyes must be removed.  
The judge agreed. 
Truculento was furious, and asked for his money instead.  But the 
judge said that since he didn’t take it when it was offered, the money 
would not be given now. Truculento then accepted Rodolfo as his lawful 
son and put him in possession of all his earnings. Then everyone was 
“content.” 
The Jew, referred to by Stephen Gosson in his pamphlet The School of 
Abuse (1579). 
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While this play is not extant, Shakespeare could have been familiar 
with it.  As Gross says, Stephen Gosson in School of Abuse “praised it 
for the seriousness with which it laid bare ‘the greediness of worldly 
choosers  and the bloody minds of usurers.’  This has sometimes 
been interpreted in terms of the two main strands in The Merchant of 
Venice with the bloody-minded usurer representing an early version 
of Shylock, and the worldly choosers foreshadowing Portia’s rejected 
suitors....” (Gross 1992, p. 17)  Therefore this seems to be the only 
play prior to Shakespeare’s that combined the story of Shylock and the 
story of the caskets into one play. It may have given Shakespeare the 
idea of weaving the two components into one play.  
Taking into account the general sources above, what did Shakespeare 
very likely borrow? 
* The pound of flesh story 
* A woman lawyer, disguised, in court  
* The Jewish moneylender 
* The contractual prohibition against spilling blood  
* The presentation of arguments in court 
* The rebellious daughter escaping from an avaricious father, eloping 
with her lover  and 
stealing from her father.  
* Three caskets or vessels with inscriptions for making the choice of an 
ideal woman. 
* Lead as the right metal of choice. 
And What Did Shakespeare Invent?  
* Shylock’s three-dimensional personality 
* Cumulative motives for the pound of flesh that are elaborately delin-
eated.  Shakespeare made sure, convincingly, that we could empathize 
with  the depths of his motivation and believe that Shylock, given the 
weight of physical and emotional injury, was justified. 
* The avarice and treachery of his daughter and her new husband 
* The human dimensions of Shylock’s speech on the humanity of a 
Winter/Spring 2008 no. 68 | 41
Jew, his courageous utterance on slavery, the stinging grief he feels in 
response to the loss of his late wife’s ring, the apostasy of his daugh-
ter, the trickery of the Christians who invited him to dinner only to use 
the opportunity to aid Jessica in her escape, and his own  forced and 
completely arbitrary conversion. 
* The implacable abusiveness of the non-Jews in Shylock’s world.  
* The plethora of character flaws  in every person with whom Shylock 
has a relationship. 
* The moral discrepancies between what people say and what they do. 
* The incongruities between outer appearance and inner substance, 
symbolized by the caskets.  
* Everyone is as materialistic as Shylock ;  they all have a reverential 
loyalty to Mammon.  
* Jewish-Christian tensions in the Jacob-Laban dialogue and in the 
slavery monologue, embodied in the antagonism between Shylock and 
Antonio. Excluding the trial scene, all else is Shakespeare’s invention 
with Shylock and Antonio as foils to each other.  
On the basis of what Shakespeare creates, then, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the playwright examined many sources, including 
Marlowe’s play, and transformed the conventional  and historically 
stereotypical portrayal of the Jew as transparent and thoroughgoing 
villain into an unappealing  human being who combined both foibles 
and virtues, tenderness and cruelty – but, above all, a person who was 
wrongfully abused, humiliated, and aggrieved by his  contemporaries; 
and beyond his own time and place, suffering also from the torment of 
his people’s history. 
2.  ALL THAT GLISTERS  
Although the focus of criticism and analysis has been on Shylock, 
it is important for our understanding of the play to note that every 
character is conspicuously flawed.  Like the caskets, each one has an  
outer personality which barely conceals an inner character of extensive 
imperfection.  This places everyone in the same ship of shortcomings 
with Shylock, reminding us of what Portia herself says: “To do and to 
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know what were good to do are quite different.”  (1.2.11) Just as the 
New Testament is intended to be the fulfillment of the Old Testament, 
transcending the values of the Old, so, in their behavior as well as 
in their beliefs, Christians are supposed to surpass what Shylock 
represents.  Unfortunately, they don’t. “No relationship is without an 
edge, no jest without at least a tinge of hostility, no virtue without 
self-interest.” (Wheeler 1991, p. xiii)  In addition, Shakespeare dis-
sects every expression of anti-Jewishness through his characters from 
the “mild” prejudice of Bassanio to the violent tone of Gratiano’s verbal 
eruptions. 
Let’s see if the shortcomings of each character are textually verifiable. 
Lorenzo: Fit for treasons 
Heinrich Heine wrote:  “As to Lorenzo, he is an accomplice in a most 
infamous robbery by which according to Prussian law he would be con-
demned to fifteen years’ penal servitude after being branded and put 
in the pillory, although he had a liking for the beauties of nature, for 
moonlight scenes and music as well as for jewels and ducats.”  (Scott 
1992, p. 200)  
Lorenzo says to his new wife that individuals who dislike music are “fit 
for treasons, stratagems, and spoils.” (5.1.85)  No one is guiltier of all 
three shortcomings than Lorenzo.  For treason, he betrays Shylock, his 
new father-in-law. His stratagem is outwitting Shylock of his money.  
The spoils are Shylock’s money, jewels, and daughter. 
In his Pythagorean speeches, he says that music makes everything 
orderly and harmonious (5.1)   But his words are filled with contradic-
tions between philosophical theory and his own behavior. 
His interest in money is consistent and persistent.  Nerissa tells him 
about Shylock’s forced deed of giving his fortune after death to the 
couple, and Lorenzo replies: “Fair ladies, you drop manna in the way of 
starved people.” (5.1.290f)  But why are Lorenzo and Jessica starved 
after stealing so much from Shylock? They are perfect examples of 
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“youthful and unhandled colts” whose blood is in a “hot condition,” 
thus contradicting Lorenzo’s own reflections. 
The two of them, Lorenzo and Jessica, share a “love that is lawless 
financed by theft and engineered through a gross breach of trust. It is 
subjected to no test....The ring which ought to seal their love is traded 
for a monkey. They are spendthrift rather than liberal, thoughtless 
squanderers of stolen substance; they are aimless, drifting by chance 
from Venice to Genoa to Belmont...attended by a low-grade clown, 
who fathers illegitimate children.”  (Burckhardt 1968, p. 224) 
Gratiano: An infinite deal of nothing 
Gratiano admits he can play a fool (1.1), which he certainly does in 
the trial scene. He admits that he talks too much, which he certainly 
does, also in the trial scene.  Lorenzo confirms this when he says that 
“Gratiano never lets me speak.”(1.1)  Bassanio corroborates it and 
adds to loquacity that  “Gratiano speaks an infinite deal of nothing...
his reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff: you 
shall seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them, they 
are not worth the search.”(1.1) 
He is the only character in the play who uses vulgarities, the most 
boorish being the very last line of the play with “ring” referring to “vul-
va.”  A question often asked, but unanswered, is a simple one: Why 
should the most uncouth individual in the play be given the final line? 
Gratiano continually interrupts the proceedings in court with pugna-
cious remarks, representing the bigot who can easily cross the line 
from verbal abuse to violence, personifying the dangerous stereotypes 
of Jews harbored by Christian communities for centuries. 
Bassanio lets Gratiano know it:  “Thou art too wild, too rude, and bold 
of voice [with] wild behavior.”  (2.2) 
In court, Gratiano compares the gallows to the baptismal font. His 
most brutal and vulgar anti-Semitism “is the keynote of a whole cho-
rus of anti-Jewish abuse in which many other voices joined: a chorus 
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in which the leitmotif is ‘dog’ and its variations.”  (Fiedler in Bloom 
1986, p. 70)  In brief, he is the voice of anti-Semitic psychology.  
Gratiano’s remarks about the relationship of Pythagoreanism to the 
immortality of an animal’s soul bring to mind his own animalistic be-
havior which borders on savagery.  
He also talks about acting the perfect hypocrite (2.2.180ff); at least 
he is honest about his own hypocrisy, especially since his behavior is 
completely at odds with what the “observance of civility” means to 
him; namely, sober habits, prayer books, saying grace, and respecting 
older generations. (2.2.177) 
Launcelot Gobbo and Father: Truth will out 
The clown deceives his blind father, but complains that his master 
Shylock doesn’t feed him enough.  Is he creditable if he can deceive 
his own blind father? Incidentally, did Shakespeare intend to create an 
analogy here between Launcelot and his blind father on one hand, and 
Jacob and his blind father Isaac (especially since Jacob is prominently 
featured in the play)? 
Launcelot undermines household decorum, evidently imposing his own 
personality where it does not belong relative to his employment. He 
also impregnates a Moorish woman (2.2.32-95, 5.7-9; 3.5.26f, 33-38). 
All told, Launcelot is an unsavory, unattractive character, not to be 
found in any of the sources, completely invented by Shakespeare. 
The Duke of Venice: He shall do this, or else 
The arbiter of Venetian justice is hardly neutral in the commencement 
of proceedings in the court of justice when he speaks about Shylock to 
Antonio: 
“I am sorry for thee. Thou art come to answer 
A stony adversary, an inhuman wretch, 
Uncapable of pity, void and empty 
From any dram of mercy.”  (4.1.3f) 
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He also appeals to the values of “human gentleness and love,” while 
at the same time displaying the very opposite by focusing on Shylock 
as an outsider and a pariah. He speaks about Antonio’s bad luck by 
expecting “commiseration of his state from brassy bosoms and rough 
hearts of flint, from stubborn Turks and Tartars never train’d to offices 
of tender courtesy.” (4.1.29f) Various ethnic groups evidently do not 
have the training in sensitivity that Christians do; Jews are included in 
such bosoms and hearts.  
Bassanio: To shoot another arrow 
The first thing we learn about Portia from Bassanio is that she is a 
wealthy woman.  (1.1.161)  His materialism shines vividly with state-
ments about love that are filled with words like gold, worth, value, 
and thrift.  We also learn that he is prodigal, reckless with money 
borrowed, and in great debt. (1.1.128) He only gets out of trouble 
because of Portia’s wealth and Antonio’s willingness to risk his life to 
help his best friend. 
Because of his debts, marrying Portia will free him from his “chief 
care” (1.1.127f) – his financial liabilities.   Bassanio, however, has his 
moments of hypocrisy, especially when he says: “...gaudy gold....I will 
none of thee;” except, of course, for Antonio’s, Shylock’s, and Portia’s 
willingness to provide him with his pecuniary needs and desires.  “The 
world is still deceiv’d with ornament,” he says (3.2), but he brings 
“gifts of rich value” anyway in order to win Portia.  (2.9.91). Bassanio 
may be the least unattractive of all the characters, surely the least 
anti-Jewish. But his integrity is questionable, borrowing repeatedly 
without repaying his debtor.  
Portia: Aweary of this great world 
The first words we hear from our heroine is that she is “aweary of this 
great world.” (2.1) 
Nerissa, her “waiting-woman,” tries to analyze this weariness by say-
ing that Portia “surfeits with too much” (1.2.5), and then offers her 
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Aristotelian advice to assuage Portia’s sense of ennui by applying the 
golden mean instead of living excessively: “It is no mean happiness, 
therefore, to be seated in the mean....” 
The Prince of Morocco leaves Portia’s home after choosing the wrong 
casket in his attempt to win her hand. Her response is, “To offend and 
judge are distinct offices (2.9.61),” 
which is precisely what she does in the trial scene where she acts as 
both judge and prosecutor. 
There she has “decreed” that Shylock is wrong and Antonio is right be-
fore listening and understanding both sides in spite of her words about 
looking at every moral issue within its contextual situation: “Nothing 
is good, I see, without respect....How many things by season season’d 
are to their right praise and true perfection!” (5.1.99, 107f) 
Portia is relieved after the Moor chooses the wrong casket, but not for 
a reason we want to hear from a heroine:  "Let all of his complexion 
choose me so." (2.7.79)  That is, let all people of dark skin choose a 
rotting skull!   This comes after Morocco says: "Mislike me not for my 
complexion." [2.l l] And Portia does. 
She also mixes religion with her prejudice in saying: “If he have the 
condition of a saint and the complexion of a devil, I had rather he 
should shrive me than wive me.” (1.2.123f) But she also reveals her 
hypocrisy in response to his hope that she will not “mislike” him for his 
“complexion,” when she responds that he stands “as fair as any 
comer.” (2.20f). So from the heroine herself we discover the first 
indications of racial bigotry in the play. Portia makes external judg-
ments–evaluating others by their surface appearance...instead of what 
is beneath, thereby living her own words:    “If to do were as easy 
as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and 
poor men’s cottages princes’ palaces,–it is a good divine that follows 
his own instructions,–I can easier teach twenty what were good to 
be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching: the 
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brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temper leaps o’er a cold 
decree....” (1.2.12f) – words that certainly augur her demeanor in the 
trial scene in the incongruity between her words about mercy and her 
consequent actions. 
It is important to compare her intolerance to the racism in Othello, and 
ask ourselves: Because Othello is filled with statements of racial big-
otry, was the author a racist? We will examine this question later, but 
it should be at least mentioned here because Shakespeare has been 
accused of being anti-Semitic. 
 Portia, in fact, generalizes about other individuals also. She is scornful 
of the foreigner who is interested in horses, the one who drinks, the 
one who will be affectatious, the one who is dumb–all based not on 
their unique individuality but on national-ethnic stereotyping. 
Portia manipulates Bassanio into choosing the right casket.  Her de-
ception in hinting at which casket Bassanio should choose also goes 
against her sacred vow to her dead father. Thus Jessica’s betrayal of 
Shylock parallels Portia’s betrayal of her father. 
To get Bassanio to choose the right casket, she uses the word "hazard” 
[3.2.l], which is linked to the Leaden Casket: "who chooseth me must 
give and hazard all he hath" (2.7.9), and then she arranges a song to 
be sung while Bassanio is trying to make a decision about which casket 
to select.  The song contains words rhyming with lead: "d. bred, head, 
nourishe" (3.2.63) 
Caskets themselves may be a metaphor to help us understand a par-
tial meaning of the play – a meaning that is actually articulated more 
than once: We must look underneath, not on the surface for under-
standing. 
 Portia rhapsodizes about mercy in one of Shakespeare’s most beau-
tiful speeches, but she  applies excessive justice (still another expres-
sion of excess which Nerissa observes to be Portia’s primary problem 
in being “aweary of this great world”).   In the courtroom, mercy 
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becomes irrelevant as it is sacrificed for justice beyond any reasonable 
or humane measure.  Her beautiful speech on mercy patently “does 
not teach us all” to be merciful. She shows this discrepancy in saying 
that the Jew must be merciful. Even Shylock doesn’t understand the 
coupling of the words “mercy” and “must.”  Mercy is spontaneous, 
natural, self-motivated – there is no must about it. In fact, when Portia 
demands mercy, Shylock already knows what is to follow; that he is 
condemned even before the sentence is declared.  “Must” is the key 
that the conclusion of the trial will be “all justice” and no mercy. 
In the courtroom, as we move through Portia’s control of the situation 
from mercy to severe legality, Portia says: 
"...there is no power in Venice 
Can alter a decree established. 
'Twill be recorded for a precedent, 
And many in error by the same example 
Will rush into the state. It cannot be." 
There is no more talk of mercy; now it is justice,  pure and simple....
and then, even beyond justice when she says to Shylock: 
"...as thou urgest justice, be assured 
Thou shalt have justice more than thou desir'st." (4.l.315) 
Shylock is now willing to accept three times the amount of his bond, 
but not Portia: "The Jew shall have all justice. Soft, no haste! He shall 
have nothing but the penalty." (4.l.320) 
Shylock: "Give me my principal and let me go." 
Portia: "He shall have merely justice and his bond." 
Shylock: "Shall I not have barely my principal?" 
Portia: "Thou shalt have nothing but the forfeiture." 
As he prepares to leave, she says: "Tarry, Jew: The law hath yet an-
other hold on you." 
So Shylock demands that the bond be taken literally just as it was 
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signed and notarized. But Portia insists that it be taken even more 
literally, and says:  "Down therefore and beg mercy of the Duke." 
What does justice have to do with forcing him to the floor?  In this 
action, there is hardly the remotest resemblance to the quality that 
drops like the gentle rain from heaven.  Mercy proves completely irrel-
evant to the real situation.  What an enormous gap between ideal and 
reality!  Portia’s insistence on “all justice” seems to refer to applying 
a law to Shylock which had no right of application in this case, taking 
from Shylock all his possessions, and exhorting his soul. 
“All justice” means that the enforcement of the forfeited bond  which 
was declared legal was then turned against Shylock, putting him into a 
position of being unable to object to anything the “court” decides to do 
against him, including the termination of  life itself. Had the complaint 
been nullified, then Shylock would not be able to collect the loan on 
the strength of the bond. But they went far beyond this to the question 
of executing him.   This so-called law that they were about to put into 
effect does not even apply to Shylock on the basis of the law that was 
legally applicable. 
Venetian society appears to permit Shylock a legal standing, and 
yet the legal protection that is supposedly his is undermined by the 
process of one law subverting another.  Earlier, he said to the Duke: 
“What judgment shall I dread, doing no wrong?” (89)  When a con-
founded Shylock moves from saying “I stand here for law” (142) to “Is 
this the law?” (309), he reveals his shocked recognition that the law as 
now applied to him – the Jew, the stranger, the alien, the outsider -- 
is a sham.  When Portia, the Duke, and Antonio mete out sentences of 
“all justice,” with Gratiano bellowing in the background, it is remindful 
of Cicero’s famous adage: summum jus, summa injuria – “extreme 
justice is extreme injury [or extreme injustice].”   For Shylock to re-
ceive “all justice,” (4.1.417) he must receive “nothing but the penalty,” 
which happens to be “extreme justice” or injury. 
When Portia demands that Shylock bow down to the Duke, she is 
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also forcing him to engage in a gesture violative of Judaism.  The 
tradition is that one bows only in the presence of God, not before any 
human. This is one of the essential messages of the biblical story of 
Esther, Mordecai, and Haman.  But it goes further. What does bowing 
signify?  If I feel a sense of wonder, awe, reverence, I may feel the 
need to pay respect and homage. It is the religious sense–what Sam 
Keen calls the “sixth sense”–that I am in the presence of something 
“wonder-ful.”  And it is natural for me to bow in homage before some 
presence or some phenomenon that I consider so filled with wonder 
that it is “sacred.”  For the Jew, only God is sacred; not a duke or king 
or president.  Portia’s demand, once again, is hardly merciful or even 
sensitive. 
Is it also the law that a counterfeit judge in disguise forges papers and 
then conducts a trial without that trial being declared null and void-
-not only a mistrial but a non-trial, a travesty of justice with punish-
ment perforce meted out to the pretender, forger and perjurer in the 
court? 
Because of these decisions and behaviors, Bassanio’s words become 
oracular:  “In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt but, being sea-
son’d with a gracious voice, obscures the show of evil?”  (3.2.75f) The 
most fundamental issue that makes the trial fraudulent is a basic prin-
ciple of jurisprudence. To take a pound of flesh, Portia reminds Shy-
lock, he must not cut an ounce more nor an ounce less than a pound, 
“in the estimation of a hair;” neither must he shed one drop of blood.  
It is simply erroneous, of course, that a creditor might be punished 
for taking less than what he is entitled to by law.  The axiom is that in 
order to execute a legally admissible action (cutting a pound of flesh) 
its natural and inevitable consequences (such as bleeding) are also 
legally admissible.  If a pound of flesh is excised (a legal act according 
to the notarized bond), then blood must flow (also legal, therefore, 
because it is unavoidable in order to realize the penalty)..  Here is 
where the whole process in the courtroom breaks down, invalidating 
the trial and trivializing justice itself.   Adapting the story he inherited, 
Shakespeare was exposing the entire charade of jurisprudence in this 
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kangaroo court. 
If the playwright himself was committed to the very purpose of drama 
spoken by Hamlet to the actors, then he must have wanted this distor-
tion and twisting of justice to be shown “her own image.”  The image 
here is of individuals who believe in one form of justice for themselves 
and another altogether for the mere alien or outsider.  Instead of a 
court of law, Shylock is sequestered in an enemy camp of vigilantes. 
Furthermore, is there an ironic relationship between Portia’s mercy 
speech and her words about being reimbursed for her “professional” 
services?  “My mind was never yet more mercenary.” (4.1.414)  Why 
did Shakespeare use the word “mercenary” if not to see the contradic-
tory relationship to mercy in Portia’s speech and in her behavior?  We 
have heard about mercy, but what we have experienced is a merce-
nary subversion of mercy.  Portia’s behavior is mercenary more than it 
is merciful. 
“...it is Portia who fails Shylock,” Harold Goddard argues, “not Shylock 
Portia. The same thing happens to her that happened to him at that 
other supreme moment when he offered Antonio the loan without 
interest. Her antipodal self emerges....Her ‘therefore, Jew’ gives an 
inkling of what is coming. You can hear, even in the printed text, the 
change of voice, as Portia sinks from compassion to legality....” (1951, 
pp. 106-107) 
This change is also manifest in the fact that Shylock never knows that 
Balthazar is really Portia.  But is strict, literal justice really a disguise, 
or is it the real Portia while the mask is worn for the speech on mercy?  
Is it just another depiction of the contemptuous treatment by Chris-
tians of the Jew in contrast to the engaging friendship and compassion 
exchanged exclusively among themselves?  Then we hear Shylock's 
heart-broken words:  "I pray you give me leave to go from hence. I 
am not well." (395) 
Portia's speech  did not teach her to be compassionate, again remind-
ing  us of her own words:  "I can easier teach twenty what were good 
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to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching." 
l.2.l2-l7.  Indeed, there may have been twenty individuals in the 
courtroom when she taught about mercy, but failed to follow her own 
lesson.  In fact, Portia insists that Shylock not only accept the verdict 
but do so with gratification:  “Art thou contented, Jew? What dost thou 
say?”  (4.1.388)  
As the trial scene is a satire on a court of justice, Portia’s speech on 
mercy is also a satire in terms of her own hypocrisy in demanding 
more than justice.  It turns out to be nothing more than the exertion 
of power by the insiders against the ultimate impotence of the outsid-
er, having nothing to do with justice or due process or the evidentiary 
standards of a court trial. 
Furthermore, the courtroom becomes linked to the casket story 
through the behavior of the principal characters. Recall the essence 
of the inscription on the golden casket: More Than You Deserve.  This 
could possibly represent the negation of getting too much, and the 
irony that the Jew will have more than justice – more than he really 
deserves. 
Portia also lies to Bassanio about her false identity as a lawyer, in 
addition to lying about going to “live in prayer and contemplation...
until...my lord’s return.”  She deceives him by asking, as Balthazar, for 
the wedding ring (4.1.420f) in addition to being rigid and unsparing in 
her literalness about the ring as a symbol of loyalty (3.2.436; 2.2.172; 
5.1.226).  Portia is not the person she pretends to be. 
 Antonio and Bassanio are in the very shadow of death, but she post-
pones the conclusion she is to present, keeping them in the throes of 
anguish longer than necessary. What possessed her to torture Bassan-
io and Antonio with unnecessary suspense?  There is no answer. 
Antonio: Much ado to know myself 
Richard Posner reminds us that “there is something...not altogether 
wholesome about Antonio....in his joylessness, wifelessness, melan-
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choly, anti-Semitism, and essential solitariness, he is almost the Chris-
tian mirror of Shylock.” (1998, pp. 108-109) 
 We never find out the nature of his mysterious despondency referred 
to in the opening lines of the play, but he must try to know himself, to 
understand himself.  Perhaps the next reference to sadness reveals the 
answer as he swears by two-headed Janus (one head smiling and the 
other frowning). Could the sadness stem from his Janus-like behavior 
of love towards those who are like him and his hatred of Shylock who 
is different -- the fact that he is capable of both love and hate at the 
same time? (1.1.50)  Maybe he’s the real fool because he “pries not 
to the interior” of himself. (2.9.27)  In fact, Antonio says, “O what a 
goodly outside falsehood hath!” (1.3.97)   But it requires considerable 
work, sometimes painful work, to be true to oneself. 
 Antonio relentlessly abuses Shylock with epithets, showing his  pure 
hatred.  Shylock says that Antonio spat on him, spurned him, and 
called him a dog.  It is difficult to imagine a good “gentleman” kicking 
and spitting on any human being.  Antonio replies: “I am like to call 
thee so again, to spit on thee again, to spurn thee also.” He is the 
only one in the play who actually uses physical abuse as well as verbal 
abuse. 
Nor can he believe that the Jew could be kind and says: “Hie thee, 
gentle Jew [perhaps a pun on gentile], the Hebrew will turn Christian, 
he grows kind.” (3.2.174) Are Christians the only ones who can be 
kind?  Does this good person really believe this?  It would seem so 
since, later, he stereotypes all Jews as callous: Nothing is harder than 
a “Jewish heart” (4.1.78) – a generalization that had been around at 
least since the time of Chaucer. In The Prioriess’s Tale, he refers to 
“Satan who has his wasp’s nest in the Jewish heart.” 
 Antonio insists that the transaction with Shylock should be “one be-
tween enemies, so that, if I forfeit, you can exact the penalty with a 
better conscience and so that I may retain my right to spit on you,” 
although Shylock did say that he would like to be friends and take no 
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interest from Antonio – just an outright loan with “no doit of usance for 
my moneys.” (1.3.137f)  Shylock’s offer of friendship is a powerful one 
if friendship means the erasure of boundaries between two individuals. 
Boundaries, however, have been a primary instrument for defining the 
Jew and the Jew’s relationship to Christians.  To be an enemy is, above 
all, to persist in retaining boundaries. Shylock wants them dropped, 
which is inconceivable to Antonio.  One of the ways that Antonio un-
derstands his own Christian identity is through the ostracism of the 
Jew.  To be a Christian is not to be a Jew; hence, they must remain 
enemies. Friendship in this community is friendship narrowly limited to 
the community itself.  Portia herself expresses this circumscribed idea 
of friendship when she says: “...in companions that do converse and 
waste the time together, whose souls do bear an equal yoke of love, 
there must be needs a like proportion of lineaments, of manners, and 
of spirit....” (3.4.10f) 
The irony is that after being spat upon and kicked, Shylock is still will-
ing to be Antonio’s friend, showing himself to be more “Christian” than 
Antonio by his willingness to turn the other cheek and to enter into a 
friendship with someone who is “different,” unlike him in many ways. 
Portia’s words represent the sentiment of the community about friend-
ship; it should be a “like proportion.” 
Antonio is also hypocritical in his attitude toward usury, or inter-
est-bearing loans.  On the one hand, he is opposed to usury and 
would “neither lend nor borrow by taking nor by giving of excess....” 
(1.3.56f)  That is his principle, but it is a principle that he also violates 
by making an exception of borrowing for Bassanio.  He resists usury on 
principle except when it’s advantageous for him to suspend the prin-
ciple.  “...yet to supply the ripe wants of my friend,” says Antonio, “I’ll 
break a custom.”  (1.3.60)  His inconsistency combined with self-rec-
titude must have been annoying to Shylock who says to him: “...
methoughts you said, you neither lend nor borrow upon advantage.” 
And Antonio self-righteously replies: “I do never use it.”  For Shylock, 
“never” and “yet” appear to be mutually exclusive. 
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Antonio forces Shylock to convert to Christianity. Note that Antonio 
uses the word “provided” in 4.1.382, implying “or else execution.”   
Antonio doesn’t give Shylock much of a choice: to convert or to die. 
His ultimatum hardly manifests the quality of mercy dropping as the 
gentle rain.  In fact, one of the key words in the charming mercy 
speech may be “strained.”  Portia is saying that mercy can never be 
strained.  But Shylock does just that, at least he strains Portia’s sense 
of mercy since she plans to outdo justice itself. If mercy is strained, 
then, it must be something other than mercy.  Her words become 
contradictory (perhaps hypocritical?) within the courtroom scene. 
Then, when Portia asks Antonio what mercy he can render, he replies: 
"So please my lord the Duke and all the court 
To quit the fine for one half of his goods, 
I am content; so he will let me have 
The other half in use, to render it 
Upon his death unto the gentleman 
That lately stole his daughter. 
Two things provided more, that for this favor 
He presently become a Christian; 
The other, that he do record a gift, 
Here in the court of all he dies possess'd 
Unto his son Lorenzo and his daughter."  (4.1.380f) 
There is not the least tinge of mercy in this judgment – only the stern-
est kind of justice, that of retribution. 
Perhaps Antonio seizes upon retribution for reasons other than the 
fact that Shylock almost succeeded in killing him, which may be rea-
son enough.  This man who coercively imposes a change of religious 
identity on “the Jew” is the same person who, shortly before this, 
called himself a “tainted wether of the flock” (4.1.113) – possibly the 
only male among his group of fellow-Christian men incapable of sexual 
deftness, of seminal emission, of reproducing, of breeding in contrast 
to the prolific mammals of Shylock’s biblical dialogue with Antonio. 
Among other reasons, Antonio hates Shylock for the exuberance of his 
sexual interpretation of the Jacob-Laban story.  With no female com-
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panion, with a seemingly excessive love for Bassanio, and his melan-
choly in response to Bassanio’s departure for Belmont and Portia, An-
tonio’s “want-wit sadness” points to a problem of sexual disorientation, 
possibly impotence, even asexuality.  When Shylock is enmeshed in 
Portia’s courtroom sophistry, Antonio’s opportunity arrives to compen-
sate for his impotence and confusion by using the little power given 
him in court to punish Shylock in a most injurious way.  He must feel 
an adrenal surge from robbing Shylock of his past, present, and future. 
Antonio uses another form of murder for his revenge.  “Hates any man 
the thing he would not kill?”  (4.1.66)  Antonio hates Shylock’s Jewish 
identity; the fortunate moment arrives to expunge it by mandatory 
decree. 
Become A Christian Or Else  
Forced conversion, however, is a repudiation of Christian values (as are 
other behaviors in the play) while, at the same time, as Freud points 
out (21:132), it is a symbolic killing [by Christianity and Antonio] of 
the religion of the father [Judaism and Shylock].  This may be the 
meaning of that passage in which Bassanio reflects: “In religion, what 
damned error but some sober brow will bless it and approve it with a 
text, hiding the grossness with fair ornament?” (3.2.77f) What other 
religion could he be referring to if not Christianity?  Doesn’t Christi-
anity, as manifest in the play, show the “damned error” of retribution 
exacted by the Duke’s and Antonio’s vicious resolutions against Shy-
lock, which contradicts the very principle of mercy, and even justice 
itself?  Is this “grossness” not hid with the “fair ornament” of Christian 
triumphalism and self-rectitude? 
In the sixth century, Pope Gregory I (590-604) declared Judaism to be 
“a superstitious depravity,” but decreed that Jews should not be bap-
tized by force: He clearly stated his argument against coercion: “.... 
when [a Jew] is brought to the font of baptism, not by the sweetness 
of preaching but by compulsion, he returns to his former superstition, 
and dies the worse from having been born again.”  Gregory believed 
that his teachers’ benevolence could accomplish much more than force 
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so that “the mind of the convert returns not again to his former vomit 
[and leads him] to the regeneration of a new life.” 
Gregory’s position was reaffirmed in the twelfth century by St. Thomas 
Aquinas who also asserted, however, that Jews were “doomed to per-
petual servitude and the princes may regard the possessions of Jews 
as belonging to the State...”  After some time Aquinas’ position actual-
ly became law, evident from the words of a great English jurist, Henri 
de Bracton: “The Jew cannot have anything of his own. Whatever he 
acquires he acquires not for himself but for the king.” 
Paul, in Romans 11, indicated that Jews can only be redeemed through 
conversion.  His argument, in sum,  is this:  Because of the iniquity of 
Jews, God chose Gentiles for salvation. That would make Jews jealous; 
they will want to be included in Christian salvation. Their inclusion will 
mean “life from the dead.”  They have fallen, but God has the power 
to graft them in again. Paul, however, never asserted that conversion 
should be coerced. 
Antonio foreshadows his own coercive demand that Shylock convert 
when he says: “The Hebrew will turn Christian: he grows kind.” 
(1.3.175). In addition, Antonio knows the sanctity of the ring’s symbol-
ism in Bassanio and Portia’s relationship, and yet he tries to persuade 
Bassanio to give it up. (4.2.448ff.)  Antonio violates the very values 
he seemingly professes. So does every member of the Christian com-
munity.  Things are not what they seem, whether we refer to casket or 
Christian.  Not one Christian is true to the values they profess.  Their 
behavior runs counter to their own Christian ideals. 
A. D. Moody wrote:  “To emphasize the importance and centrality of 
the irony, I would suggest that the play is ‘about’ the manner in which 
the Christians succeed in the world by not practicing their ideals of love 
and mercy; that it is about their exploitation of an assumed unworldli-
ness to gain the worldly advantage over Shylock; and that, finally it is 
about the essential likeness of Shylock and his judges, whose triumph 
is even more a matter of mercenary justice than his would have been.  
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In this view the play does not celebrate the Christian virtues so much 
as expose their absence.”  (1964, p. 10) 
Meyer Jack Landa agrees in writing that the play is “a scathing indict-
ment of the Christianity of the day.” (1969, p. 78)  Do the Christians 
define themselves as a community only by ostracizing the Jewish com-
munity?  This is precisely what England did from 1290 to 1655 with 
the most extreme form of ostracism: total expulsion. 
Expulsion of a people one believes to be inferior and rejected becomes 
more understandable when you stand before the Strasbourg Cathedral, 
completed in 1260.  There are two statues: one female (the Church) 
triumphantly crowned and proudly holding a cross; the other statue, 
also a female, the Synagogue, downhearted, blindfolded, with droop-
ing arms – a sculptured rendition of the “ancient grudge 
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The Spiritual Path of Kabbalah  
“Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals: Eating and Embodiment in 
Medieval Kabbalah” by Joel Hecker. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press.  
A review essay by Kristin M. Swenson  
How does Madonna do it?! I admit a certain wonder bordering on real 
admiration for people who have adopted Kabbalah as their definitive 
spiritual path… and are still able to maintain a superstar lifestyle. This 
stuff is terribly complicated. It’s much easier to imagine Medieval Jews 
hunkered down over desks covered with reference documents and 
engaged for countless hours in study and debate, rising every now 
and then only to shake the dust out of their hair. As for the appeal of 
religious traditions that allow for a person’s full humanity – physical as 
well as spiritual – this I can understand, having explored dimensions 
of pain in biblical poetry. And lately, I’ve been thinking about food and 
religion – how food and the mundane physical business of eating can 
have spiritual implications and so bear on the whole person.  
So Joel Hecker’s “Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals,” subtitled “Eating 
and Embodiment in Medieval Kabbalah” promised to feed my curiosity. 
After all, it chronicles Hecker’s “[search] to uncover mystical experi-
ences of the fictional rabbinic illuminates who populate the narratives 
and homilies of medieval kabbalah with an aim, ultimately, of finding 
the place of eating as an aspect of embodiment within the kabbalistic 
ethos.” Body and mind, the spiritual in the physical, food and religion, 
embodiment and mysticism—so far so good. Indeed, Hecker (associate 
professor of Jewish mysticism at the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Col-
lege) confesses in the introduction that he believes a person’s stomach 
can house the spiritual as well as the matzo brei. Nevertheless, by the 
end of the book, Hecker does not definitively demonstrate a balance of 
body and soul in the kabbalah. Instead, despite the priority that eating 
has in the texts that he explored, Hecker finally concludes that real 
physical matters play second fiddle to the spiritual for these Jewish 
mystics. But no matter, getting to that conclusion through Hecker’s 
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exploration is fascinating, and it illuminates a constant ambivalence 
that at least allows both food and the body a place at the kabbalists’s 
spiritual table.  
Hecker suggests that it’s how the kabbalists think, that it’s the mystical 
imagination, which bridges the gap between food and spirit. He writes 
of the kabbalists’ “eating with sacramental intent,” of participating 
through flights of mystical imagination in the manna and quail picnics 
of the ancient Israelites and dining with Temple priests on the show-
bread of long ago while eating in the present. In the process of eating 
like this with such intention, the food consumed feeds the kabbalists’ 
spirits, too. But much of their discussion of food serves a metaphorical 
or symbolic function to describe the give-and-take between God and 
people that may well have nothing to do with actual meat and bread.  
The book begins with a survey of the relationship between food and 
religion in the Hebrew bible and in Judaism before the development 
of the kabbalah. Although preliminary, I found this chapter especially 
interesting and helpful. Hecker divides the biblical references into the 
following categories and sections: Miraculous Foods, Covenantal Meals, 
Metaphorical Meals, Human Consumption of Sacrificial Offerings, Food 
for God, Dietary Laws, Ritual Slaughter and Blood Prohibition, “You 
Shall Not Seethe a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk,” and Celebrating Passover. 
After a brief discussion of how the Pharisees understood and controlled 
food choices of the Second Temple period, Hecker turns his attention 
to a more extended explanation of the “rabbinic development of eating 
practices.” This latter includes the idea that a person could be nour-
ished by the Shekinah just as definitely as by the food-stuff in one’s 
pantry. Of course it’s to the rabbis that we owe the tomes of dietary 
legislation called kashrut. And Hecker notes how these laws served to 
distinguish not just what one should and shouldn’t eat but also who is 
Jew and who is not. The kabbalists were aware of and made use of all 
of these ideas, and Hecker writes, “Out of the profusion of materials, 
they carved a coherent, if not homogeneous, set of approaches for 
thinking about food and ingesting and incorporating the divine blessing 
they sought” (56).  
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In the second chapter, titled “‘A Blessing in the Belly’: Mystical Sati-
ation,” Hecker notes how the feeling of satisfaction that comes from 
eating enough was considered by the kabbalists to be a prerequisite 
for blessing. Consequently, even if one hasn’t exactly filled up on the 
material goods of food and drink, it is important to engage the mind in 
such a way as to trick the body into feeling full. Hecker also addresses 
in this chapter the matter of fasting and sacrifice as paradox – losing 
in order to gain, giving up in order to get. He also touches on the 
relationship of the pleasures of eating to the pleasures of sex, a topic 
Hecker picks up again toward the end of the succeeding chapter con-
cerning “The Role of Idealized Foods.”  
Relationship – the connections between an individual’s body and soul, 
between two people, and between people in a social context – lies at 
the heart of kabbalistic theology and is inseparable from the relation-
ship of a mystic to the Shekinah. Desire, hunger, satiety, and pleasure 
are as much a part of the mystic’s experience as they are of the basic 
human necessity of eating. Even, Hecker observes, the simple act of 
sitting down to a meal has a cognate in the activity that prepares the 
contemplative for a visionary experience.  
The kabbalists believe that a person can influence God, and Hecker 
notes that according to the kabbalah such “theurgy” tops the list of 
why the commandments exist. In “‘Blessing Does Not Rest on an Emp-
ty Place’: Talismanic Theurgy,” Hecker asks how the kabbalists worked 
to get God to give them food – food, that is, in its most spiritual sense 
as well as its material sense. The blessings of God flow out from the 
Divine in a great river of excess and run all the way down to the per-
son at table, when things go as planned.  
But the divine blessings that the kabbalist seeks are not only a func-
tion of the individual’s communion with God but also a product of the 
individual’s charitable relationship to others. Hecker observes a tradi-
tion within the Zohar of associating the act of caring for poor people, 
especially of feeding the needy with this flow of blessings. “Further-
more,” he notes, “the commandment is perceived by the Zohar as an 
64 | VCU Menorah Review
expression of the interconnectivity of one’s physical environment, one’s 
own body, the bodies of one’s guests, and the body of the Divinity” 
(178).  
All this talk of body would seem to suggest that for the kabbalist, 
the material expression of humanity – our bodies and our need for 
food – would be primary, the basic means of attaining a mystical union 
with God. But finally, according to Hecker, it seems not. For all the 
food-based symbolism, metaphors of eating, sexuality and the senses, 
eating to the kabbalists is finally more a way of thinking about spiri-
tual matters than a practical bodily necessity with implications for the 
spiritual life. As Hecker puts it, “Eating for the Zohar is highly stylized, 
without explicit interest in food per se, but it is interested in how the 
activity is framed” (179). Finally, for the kabbalists, the spiritual is 
firmly fixed as of greatest priority – the rich metaphorical world of 
foodstuffs and bodily pleasures are valuable not so much for what they 
say about food and body but more for how they serve to imagine the 
dynamic relationship that is the self-and/in/of-God.  
Kristin M. Swenson is a professor of religious studies at Virginia Com-
monwealth University and a contributing editor.  
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